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in Nineteenth-Century Theories on Government 
Offices




Architectural historiography is seldom concerned with the antithetical 
notions of ‘noise’ and ‘silence’. In this case study, I tentatively explore 
the theme in the context of nineteenth-century administrative build-
ings. More particularly, I investigate the normative views of British 
and French authors concerning acoustic perception in one subtype of 
‘bureaucratic’ architecture: the ministerial office building. Drawing 
examples from the work of, among others, ‘panopticon’ theorist Jeremy 
Bentham and the architect Julien Guadet, I point at the centrality of 
‘sound control’ or ‘sound management’ in architectural discourses on 
office buildings. In the specific domain of ministerial offices, moreover, 
these discourses were rife with ideological views on the nature and the 
functioning of government itself.
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The Sounds of the Bureaucratic Machinery
Large administrative organizations – let me call them, without pejora-
tive intent, bureaucracies – always forge a distance between themselves 
and the public. The French jurist Jacques Chevallier has signalled that 
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the prototypical modern bureaucratic institution makes ample use of 
strategies and techniques which generate ‘exclusion and segregation’, 
in order to guarantee the ‘serenity’ of the decision-making processes. 
Among these strategies, Chevallier lists the ‘administrative secret’, as 
well as the ‘intentional delay’ in the release of documents. Furthermore, 
personal interaction between the public and bureaucracies often passes 
through literal barriers: many organizations have used (and many still 
use) counters, which can be regarded as the material and symbolic 
locus (effectively an ‘interface’) where contact can be established in a 
controlled way. Indeed, when the inner workings of the administrative 
machinery remain hidden from the outside world, a bureaucracy often 
manages to evade investigation or external pressure.1 As a result, no 
bureaucracy can ever be a ‘glass house’, Chevallier claimed.2 To a large 
degree, a ‘black box’ seems to be a better-suited metaphor.3
With his references to architecture, which are at once metaphorical 
(a glass house) and concrete (the counter hall), Chevallier has drawn 
attention to the spatial and physical constitution of the bureaucracy. 
Interestingly, Chevallier’s references point at two aspects of sensory 
perception: the visual and the auditive. In architectural historiography, 
most attention has been devoted to the former aspect, with its connota-
tions of transparency and opaqueness.4 The element of acoustic per-
ception, related to the everyday realities of conversation, sound and 
noise, has received less scrutiny, certainly with regard to architecture 
for bureaucracies. In this brief case study, I will tentatively explore the 
normative views of three nineteenth-century authors concerning acous-
tic perception in one particular subtype of bureaucratic architecture: 
the ministerial office building. Drawing examples from the United 
Kingdom and France, I want to point at the highly ambiguous centrality 
of ‘sound control’ or ‘sound management’ in architectural discourses on 
office buildings. In the specific domain of ministerial offices, moreover, 
these discourses were often rife with ideological views on the nature 
and the functioning of government itself.
Towards ‘Promptitude of Oral Intercourse’
Let me start with Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), probably the first 
author who has thoroughly reflected on the ways in which architecture 
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can (or rather should) shape political and administrative practices. 
While Bentham and his ‘panopticon’ have become household refer-
ences in different areas of cultural studies through the work of Michel 
Foucault,5 surprisingly few scholars outside the field of ‘Bentham stud-
ies’ have noticed that the English jurist and philosopher was not only a 
self-proclaimed prison reformer, but also (and, in his own eyes, perhaps 
more crucially) an aspiring reformer of government. For most of his 
life, Bentham sought to implement radical modernizations in politics, 
the judiciary and the public administration. Crucial aspects of his plans 
indeed revolved around the concept of the panopticon, although his 
thinking on this topic evolved throughout the years, as he constantly 
developed new areas of application for the panoptic scheme: schools, 
military barracks, hospitals and, finally, government. For this reason, 
Bentham scholar Anne Brunon-Ernst has coined the plural notion of 
‘panopticons’: there is no such thing as one definitive panoptic sys-
tem that can be attributed to the thinker.6 While Foucault has famously 
singled out the ‘prison panopticon’ as the essence of both Bentham’s 
world view and all modern, totalitarian strategies of oppression, many 
aspects in Bentham’s political writings can in fact be interpreted as 
strategies for the achievement of far more benign principles, such as the 
elimination of corruption in government, or the notion that politicians 
ought to be held accountable for their actions at all times.7 Architecture 
played a crucial role in these proposals, as Bentham asserted himself in 
Constitutional Code (1830), his magnum opus on governmental reform: 
‘[On] architecture, good Government has more dependence than men 
have hitherto seemed to be aware of.’8
The nature of Bentham’s intentions should be understood in the light 
of utilitarianism, the ethical doctrine which holds that the sole purpose 
of moral and political acts should be the maximization of happiness 
among the largest possible number of people. Yet, since everyone 
tries (in Bentham’s view) to maximize his or her own personal happi-
ness (sometimes, if not often, at the cost of other people’s happiness), 
Bentham complemented his ethical directives with an almost meth-
odological attitude of distrust towards all human beings. His distrust 
towards politicians and civil servants was particularly well-developed, 
since these men often held positions which involved the handling of 
public monies. To eradicate the possibility of abuses, Bentham wanted 
to submit all public functions to a so-called ‘confidence-minimization 
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principle’, which was to be complemented with a  ‘control-maximization 
principle’. Together, these principles held that every member of the 
public should be given full insight in all political and administrative 
actions at any time, with the aim of deterring misbehaviour.9
Given his strong emphasis on the creation of a well-informed public 
opinion, Bentham believed that the practice of government was to be 
driven by an urge towards transparency, or, as he called it, ‘publicity’. 
Conversely, the philosopher was a strong opponent of the secrecy that 
usually was (and still is) associated with bureaucracies.10 As such, he 
emphasized that the architecture of government offices had to be per-
meated with the postulated ideal of ‘publicity’. In Constitutional Code, 
he specified that the ministerial offices of any given country had to be 
centralized in a newly built, well-ventilated and well-lighted build-
ing with a circular, semi-circular or oval shape.11 The Prime Minister 
would be given an office at the centre, since he was the most important 
figure in government and spent much of his time delegating to min-
isterial colleagues.12 In combination with the building’s compact cir-
cularity, the central location would shorten the distance between the 
Prime Minister’s office and all other office rooms, as well as ‘the time 
consumed in passing to and fro’.13 Centralizing all administrative ser-
vices in one building would, moreover, eliminate the possibility that 
messengers got ‘robbed’ when carrying paperwork between offices.14 
The personal office of each minister (of which there were to be thirteen 
in total, the Prime Minister included) would consist of a private sec-
tion (where one could retreat for resting) and a ‘public’ section. The 
latter section of every office was to be surrounded by a number of wait-
ing rooms with ‘counters’, from where the public could interrogate the 
ministers. Most of these waiting rooms were to be organized in such a 
way that the interrogations could be followed by anyone attending, ‘as 
in the boxes of a theatre’. Only in exceptional cases, when informants 
had to be protected against eavesdroppers, Bentham deemed the use of 
private ‘waiting boxes’ legitimate.15
Considering any waste of time as an intolerable squandering of both 
human effort and government funds, Bentham further projected the 
installation of ‘conversation tubes’, in order to maximize the ‘promp-
titude of oral intercourse’ between offices. These tubes, which the phi-
losopher had originally proposed for his panoptic prison, would allow 
mutual communication between the ministers, who would each have 
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about twelve tubes at their disposal.16 In contrast with some of his ear-
lier writings on panopticons, Constitutional Code did not suggest that 
all of the building’s occupants had to be subjected to the permanent, 
monocentric, visual gaze of a supervisor. Hence, the centrally located 
Prime Minister should not be conceptualized as some kind of supreme 
overseer who remained unseen himself. Bentham’s plans for govern-
ment offices rather suggested that all ministers were to keep each other 
under permanent scrutiny by means of ‘auditory visibility’ (and here, 
I use an oxymoron that has been coined, in a different context, by art 
historian Anna Vemer Andrzejewski).17 As such, two elements became 
strategies for the achievement of ‘publicity’: on the one hand the audi-
tory ‘gaze’ among the ministers themselves; on the other hand the visual 
as well as auditory gaze of the public in the waiting rooms. There were 
indeed many potential gazes in Bentham’s government offices, but in 
principle, anyone being gazed at could return the gaze: contrary to the 
panoptic prison, the surveillance system for the government offices was 
pluricentric.18
Lastly, Constitutional Code projected the creation of a ‘Ministry of 
Legislation’, which would be permanently open to the public. In this 
way, the civil servants, who were to be monitored at all times, could 
show how the preparation of laws and the implementation of orders 
worked in practice, while all official documents had to be kept nearby, 
in publicly accessible archival rooms. The Ministry of Legislation was 
thus supposed to serve a pedagogical purpose as a kind of ‘school’ of 
government.19 During their visit, citizens would have the right, or even 
the duty, to address their officials critically, Bentham emphasized: ‘The 
military functionary is paid for being shot at, the civil functionary is 
paid for being spoken and written at.’20 In sum, silence was clearly not 
something Bentham was striving after. Instead, the ministerial office 
had to be buzzing with conversation, all for the sake of utilitarian logic 
and governmental efficiency.
‘Shut Up’ in Private Rooms?
No earlier than the mid-1850s, the architectural principles propagated 
in Constitutional Code would find some resonance in Bentham’s home-
land, even though is its unclear if this resonance resulted from causal 
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influence. Architectural historian Pedro Guedes has recently brought 
an obscure 1855 pamphlet into the spotlight, in which the unsatisfac-
tory administrative procedures and the outdated offices of the British 
Ministry of War were criticized. Indignant about the debacles of the 
British army in the ongoing Crimean War, the anonymous pamphlet-
eer (who was most probably a civil servant himself) proposed a drastic 
reform of the War administration. The construction of a new ministe-
rial office building, whose architecture was to be based on the iron and 
glass structure of the Crystal Palace (1851), emerged as an essential 
part of his reform proposal, Guedes explains:
[The proposed] three-story ‘War Administration Building’ brought every-
thing together into a single compact space – a hive of activity where close 
to 1000 clerks would work efficiently in concert in one room measuring 
110 x 58,5 m. In it every stage in processing orders could be carried out 
in proper sequence in methodical work-flow, tuned to the most efficient 
layout … Clerks sitting at desks arranged in rows to suit tasks would pro-
cess paperwork and make copies as required, all under constant supervi-
sion. Furniture would be kept low to facilitate visibility, and all partitioning 
would be non-structural and removable, so that it could be rearranged in 
response to changing requirements.21
While Constitutional Code had not offered recommendations concern-
ing iron and glass as building materials or concerning the use of flexible 
partitions, its author would surely have approved of the confidence-
minimizing logic proposed by the 1855 text. Like Bentham, the anony-
mous pamphleteer believed that a regime of surveillance, both visual 
and auditory, had to cover all administrative ranks, although he did not 
go as far as to include the minister in his scheme. The necessity to have 
all governmental employees continuously monitored, was substantiated 
in the pamphlet as follows:
Thorough supervision is as necessary with clerks as with other men, and 
can never be obtained when they are boxed and shut up in different rooms 
[i.e. separate offices, jvdm]. No doubt, under a system which permits a 
chief officer of a department to lounge all of his mornings away in his club, 
the chief clerk having become the real head of it, considers himself entitled 
to a private sitting room and other luxuries, but that is not the way to get 
work done. In [our] plan, there are no such snug places provided. But each 
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chief clerk of a department [of the Ministry of War] has nevertheless a 
separate space enclosed on three sides for himself and his principal clerks, 
and he may be allowed to carpet it and enclose the fourth side by drawing a 
curtain, if his dignity requires it, although we by no means recommend it.22
Despite the similarities with Bentham’s proposals, the 1855 text evoked 
a rather different attitude towards conversation. Having government 
employees firmly engaged in discussion (either with one another or with 
members of the public) no longer appeared as a (positive) strategy for 
creating ‘publicity’, since the work stoppage of any single employee 
would have fatally interrupted the ‘methodical work-flow’. Together with 
the advice that desks should be arranged in rows (much like in a typical 
school environment),23 the ideal typical image emerged of a workplace in 
which most employees were silenced, and in which the supervising ‘chief 
clerks’ and ‘chief officers’ were given the monopoly on verbal commu-
nication. Yet, in a certain sense, even these supervisors were subjected to 
a sound-minimizing regime: after all, whenever the ‘chief clerks’ wanted 
to retreat in order to discuss confidential matters, their curtained ‘private 
spaces’ provided little in terms of acoustic privacy.
While the immediate influence of the 1855 pamphlet seems to have 
been non-existent, the importance of having civil servants monitored 
at all times would be reiterated one year later by the high-ranking 
English civil servant Charles Trevelyan (who had earlier co-authored 
an important official report on the reform of the British public admin-
istration). In an 1856 memorandum, Trevelyan (1807–1886) made a 
plea for the construction of new ministerial office buildings, equipped 
with spacious rooms ‘for the more mechanical work’, where ‘a number 
of clerks [would work in concert] under proper superintendence’. For 
the ‘intellectual work’, Trevelyan suggested the provision of ‘separate 
rooms … so that a person who works with his head may not be inter-
rupted’.24 Here, it becomes clear that the concepts of ‘visibility’ and 
‘surveillance’ were increasingly being narrowed down, with the aim 
of having them applied to lower-ranked employees solely. This was a 
further deviation from Bentham’s 1830 proposals, which provided in 
‘publicity’ for all those holding public positions, indiscriminate of rank 
and function. At the same time, however, Trevelyan was one of the first 
who implicitly acknowledged that noise was a daily reality (as well as a 
nuisance) in the ministerial offices. Apparently, the low-ranking clerks 
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who worked ‘in concert’ were not by definition silent, or maybe the 
silence was continuously interrupted by the commands emanating from 
the supervisors. (Here, it should be taken into account that the noise 
could not yet have been produced by machinery such as typewriters, 
telephones or dictaphones: typewriters, for instance, made their break-
through no earlier than the 1880s.25) From this point of view, granting 
privacy to ‘intellectual’ workers was not so much a matter of prestige or 
a privilege for ‘snug’ high-ranking personnel (as the 1855 pamphleteer 
had seen it), but rather a functional necessity: without a silent, enclosed 
room, these brain workers could not get much work done.26
‘Neither Eyes nor Ears’
For my last example, I turn to the French ‘proto-modernist’ architect 
Julien Guadet (1834–1908),27 who published a reputed handbook, 
Élements et théorie de l’Architecture, towards the end of the ‘long’ 
nineteenth century. According to the British architectural historian 
Peter Collins, Guadet’s multi-volume handbook (which first appeared 
between 1901 and 1904) can be considered as ‘the first really thorough 
study’ of ‘building types applicable to the new age’.28 Due to the accel-
erated growth of both governmental and commercial bureaucracies in 
many countries during the fin de siècle, offices unmistakably came to 
belong to this category of buildings. As such, Guadet was also one of 
the first architectural theorists who explicitly discussed the office as a 
typology in itself.29 Illustrating his text with buildings like the Parisian 
Hôtel du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères (built 1844–1856),30 he 
summarized his views on the ideal internal disposition of any given 
office complex as follows:
For the [lower-ranking] employees, well-lighted and sufficiently comfort-
able offices suffice, which must be large enough to accommodate multiple 
workers. One room for every employee would be too expensive a luxury; 
moreover, employees often have to work together … For the sake of sur-
veillance, economy, scarcity of space, etc, many [institutions] have pleaded 
for a concentration in a single office room of all employees belonging to a 
single service … Concerning the chefs and sous-chefs, who often need to 
treat matters with discretion: they should have personal rooms.31
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Anyway, I cannot wind up without signalling the necessity of discretion. 
Sometimes, directors have to receive persons whose presence should not be 
revealed to anyone, and in such cases, it is imperative that the walls have 
neither eyes nor ears.32
In these sentences, Guadet intuitively listed a number of elements which 
would become programmatic in the domain of office design during the 
first half of the twentieth century (and even beyond): the pre-eminence 
of ‘economy’, the generation of fluid communications between differ-
ent services in an organization, the stress on ample lighting, and the 
creation of hierarchized spatial arrangements, with a grouping of the 
low-ranking personnel in large ‘open’ rooms. The necessity to exert 
‘sound control’ was also brought into the limelight, even though the 
difference with Trevelyan’s writings is striking. Guadet’s concern did 
not primarily lie in protecting the ‘intellectual workers’ from the noises 
made by the lower-ranking employees. Instead, the conversations of 
the upper-ranking had to be protected against proliferation among the 
lower-ranking and, as one may assume, the public. Like in the world of 
business, the political and administrative leaders of the ministries could 
not do without a degree of secrecy.
In conclusion, it is clear that the high ideal of universal visual and 
acoustic surveillance set by Bentham was not endorsed by  subsequent 
authors. The 1855 British pamphleteer eliminated the minister from 
the regime of surveillance, Trevelyan eliminated the ‘intellectual’ 
 workers, and Guadet defended outright the idea that top-ranking 
employees were entitled to privacy whenever they deemed fit. In the 
normative discourses concerning low-ranking clerks, however, the 
legacy of Bentham’s panoptic scheme, with its confidence-minimizing 
regime, remained intact. Only after the World War I, when architec-
tural and administrative experts became influenced by the principles 
of Scientific Management (F.W. Taylor, 1911), new attempts would be 
made to bring top-ranking employees firmly into the realm of surveil-
lance: by using soundproofed glazed partition walls, members of the 
higher management could be granted ‘acoustic’ privacy while staying 
visible for colleagues.33 However, one element would remain constant 
(and this far into the twentieth century): the relative lack of interest 
among managerial and architectural theorists regarding the noise to 
which low-ranking employees were often exposed.
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